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Abstract 
Pension plans in Switzerland favour active management over indexing to implement their strategic 
asset allocation. Empirical surveys show, however, that their success in the past has been moderate 
as the median performance of Swiss pension plans in domestic and international equities is below 
market indices even gross of fees. A survey across decision-makers of Swiss pension plans sheds 
some light on why active management is still so popular across Swiss pension plans despite the 
cross-sectional lack of success in the past. A sample of decision-makers of Swiss pension plans re-
veals that they are prone to the better-than-average-effect because a majority of them expects to 
outperform the other survey participants in the future in several different domains. This paper ar-
gues that such biased perceptions of the own skill level relative to the competitors can explain the 
popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans.  
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I Introduction 
The goal to be above average is deeply rooted in human nature and can be observed in many differ-
ent domains. Studies in psychology show that people also tend to have the illusion that they are ca-
pable of delivering above average performances in various tasks (Taylor and Brown [1988]) despite 
having no adequate means to compare themselves with a representative average. This is often re-
ferred to as one facet of overconfidence called the “better-than-average-effect” and financial mar-
kets are no exception with respect to such a better-than-average-effect across investors. 
In contrast to other domains an adequate measure of the average performance is easily available on 
financial markets as data about various broad market-capitalized indices are freely accessible for 
investors. However beating the average is difficult. As Sharpe [1991] demonstrated, active man-
agement is a zero-sum game and empirical evidence shows that only a minor percentage of all in-
vestors are able to beat the performance of broad market indices net of fees in the long run. On av-
erage Swiss pension plans are no exception as they have failed to beat equity market index returns, 
too. Nevertheless the lure of potential outperformance ensures active management remains very 
popular across Swiss pension plans and the decision-makers express surprisingly high confidence to 
beat their peers in the future. The better-than-average-effect can explain the gap between Swiss 
pension plans’ expectations about their future success and their realized historical success.  
The contribution to research of this paper is twofold. First, evidence is presented that the implemen-
tation of the strategic asset allocation with active managers is more popular but historically not 
more successful than indexing from a risk-return perspective across Swiss pension plans. In the last 
couple of years Swiss pension plans achieved on average lower returns than broad market indices in 
domestic as well as international equities. The second contribution deals with expectations concern-
ing the future performance of their own pension plans in a sample of decision-makers at Swiss pen-
sion plans. Their answers in a questionnaire reveal that they on average expect i) their own pension 
plans to achieve above average returns, ii) to be able to select above average managers and iii) their 
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internal and external managers to outperform the other participants’ managers in the survey. Such 
optimistic expectations are puzzling when the average historical performance is taken into account 
and indicates that the participants in the sample are indeed prone to the better-than-average-effect. 
In this paper the focus is on the implementation of a strategic asset allocation with active managers 
instead of indexers across Swiss pension plans. The availability of index instruments today gives 
the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans a true choice between active managers and indexers 
when implementing the strategic asset allocation for traditional asset classes like equities or bonds. 
The choice of a strategic asset allocation itself can in fact also be regarded as active management as 
the board of trustees of a pension plan has to take active decisions. However for the strategic asset 
allocation of a Swiss pension plan there is no market index that could be used as a default portfolio 
so there is no true choice between active managers and indexers. Timing skills of pension plans will 
also be excluded from the analysis in this paper because meaningful data is not available. 
It is far beyond the scope of this paper to take a general view on the advantages and disadvantages 
of active management for Swiss pension plans. Successful active management depends on an array 
of circumstances like goals, skills, expectations, risk-aversions and constraints. So there is no way 
to argue for an optimal degree of active management in general because there is too much heteroge-
neity across Swiss pension plans with respect to those different circumstances. However this paper 
argues that susceptibility to the better-than-average-effect can bias the judgment of the own skills 
relative to other investors and therefore can explain the heavy reliance of the Swiss pension plan 
industry on active management in equities despite the lack of success in the past.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the main environment and 
framework Swiss pension plans are operating in. Section III reviews related research on active 
management with a special focus on pension plan performances and the issue of overconfidence in 
the domain of financial markets. Section IV describes the data sources including the answers from a 
questionnaire for the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans. Section V presents the results about 
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the relative performance of Swiss pension plans versus market indices and about the proneness to 
the better-than-average-effect in the sample of decision-makers from Swiss pension plans. Together 
with the conclusions, section VI discusses various interpretations of the results and presents other 
potential explanations for the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. 
II Swiss pension funds 
A sample of Swiss pension plans is distinct from previous studies about private investors’ or mutual 
funds’ preferences and performances of active management because the participants in this sample 
not only bear responsibility for their own investments but for the retirement savings of thousands of 
employees in Switzerland. According to a study of the Swiss National Bank for the year 2004 
roughly half of all the peoples’ wealth in Switzerland, around CHF 500 billion at that time, is man-
aged in the second pillar, i.e. in the hands of decision-makers of Swiss pension plans.2 So it is in the 
interest of the working people in Switzerland that Swiss pension plans make wise and prudent deci-
sions when implementing the strategic asset allocation. 
The pension funds under examination are segregated funded occupational pension schemes from the 
private and the public sector in Switzerland. Throughout their working life Swiss employees of 
companies or public institutions provide contributions to their pension funds which accumulate over 
time and then are used to fund retirement payments to pensioners. It is the goal of the pension funds 
to manage those inflows in a way to guarantee the payments to the pensioners without imposing 
high contributions to the current employees. The pension funds are provided by a public or private 
employer (the sponsor) and are either defined benefit or defined contribution plans or a hybrid of 
those two. Defined benefit plans offer the employee guaranteed payments in retirement from the 
sponsor usually defined as a percentage of the employee’s final salary. The risk of funding such a 
guaranteed payment is borne by the sponsor. By contrast defined contribution plans convert the 
value of an employee’s savings in the pension fund into an annuity at retirement. In a defined con-
                                                   
2
 SNB [2006]. In September 2006 estimates for the wealth in Switzerland’s second pillar are roughly at CHF 650 Bn 
Swisscanto [2006]. 
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tribution plan the employee bears the risk. In Switzerland there are many hybrid schemes that con-
tain elements of both basic types of schemes. Whether it is the employee or the sponsor that carries 
the higher burden of risk, there is no historical evidence to suggest that either type of scheme has 
more or less success using active management, nor that there are significant differences in the level 
of popularity of active management between the two (Frauenlob [1998]).  
In Switzerland the law forces the board of trustees to take decisions about the strategic asset alloca-
tion of their pension plan and they cannot delegate this responsibility. However they can rely on 
third party knowledge in the elaboration of the strategic asset allocation. Members of the board of 
trustees are not necessarily investment professionals but rather people who represent stakeholders of 
the sponsor and have been elected into the board to lobby their voters’ interest. The chosen asset 
allocation of every pension plan has to be in line with the Swiss regulatory framework.3 The im-
plementation of the chosen asset allocation in a particular pension plan is usually delegated to an 
investment committee which consists of delegates from the board of trustees and / or investment 
professionals. Most of the investment committees of Swiss pension plans consist of three to six 
members and meet between four and ten times per year. The main responsibility of such an invest-
ment committee is to appoint asset managers and to tactically rebalance (or not rebalance) the 
weightings of a pension plans’ assets within the guidelines defined by the board of trustees. Invest-
ment committees typically decide whether the day-to-day management is delegated to an external 
asset manager or whether in-house managers are hired. They also have the option to delegate certain 
tactical decisions to in-house managers. The decision about the role of active management in the 
implementation of the strategic asset allocation therefore lies in the hands of either the investment 
committees members or the in-house managers of a Swiss pension plan.  
In order to analyze explanations for the popularity of active management across Swiss pension 
plans a sample of investment committee members and managers of Swiss pension plans seems to be 
                                                   
3
 For the investement guidelines see: Verordnung über die berufliche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge 
(BVV 2), articles 50 to 59. 
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appropriate. However, the important role played by consultants and the advice they give to pension 
fund professionals cannot be overlooked. Indeed, it would be inaccurate to suggest that all decisions 
are taken independently by the investment committees. According to a survey from Lusenti [2003] 
across 195 public and private Swiss pension plans 38% use third party advice in strategic decisions. 
Only 20% of the plans in the same sample indicate that they never work with external consultants. 
Nevertheless an investment committee ultimately bears the responsibility so it is their decision that 
matters. 
III Related research on pension plans performance and overconfidence 
This paper does not go into detail on the ongoing debate about the level of success achievable 
through active management but a few introductory phrases shed some light on the basic framework 
in which the results in this paper have to be viewed. Decades ago the discussion started with the 
development of the CAPM (Sharpe [1964]) together with the Efficient Market Hypothesis by Fama 
[1970] and its weaknesses pointed out by Roll [1977] or Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. Since then 
the basic question has been whether a broad market index represents a better investment opportunity 
than an actively-managed portfolio. Carhart [1997], Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers [1997] 
and Malkiel [2004] all present empirical evidence that most mutual fund managers are unable to 
deliver a persistent outperformance versus a broad market index net of fees. By the same token  
there is no doubt that some active managers delivered an outperformance versus market indices 
(Siegel, Kroner and Clifford [2001]) – maybe due to luck, maybe due to skill - and investing in such 
managers would have yielded a significantly higher return than purely indexed exposure to markets.  
Frauenlob [1998] describes investment strategies for Swiss pension plans and reports that pension 
plans with a more active implementation of the strategic asset allocation do not perform better than 
other pension plans. But he points out that most of the pension plans did not outperform broad mar-
ket indices net of fees in different asset classes and over different time periods. Characteristics of a 
pension plan such as size, assets under management or pension scheme type offered no explanation 
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for the degree of active management in his study. The results of previous studies in other countries 
about the success of active managers for pension funds are mixed but the majority do not favor ac-
tive management. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] report that from 1983 to 1989 most of 
the active equity managers in a sample of 769 funds that managed assets of US pension plans deliv-
ered an underperformance and in total they underperformed the S&P 500 by 1.3% p.a. gross of fees. 
In contrast Berzins, Trzcinka and Coggin [2004] report that a sample of 549 US equity portfolios at 
US pension plans outperformed the S&P 500 by a mean of 0.65% p.a. gross of fees from 1993 to 
2003. For a sample of UK pension funds Blake, Lehman and Timmermann [1999] conclude that the 
pension plans have no selection or timing skills. In a later report Blake, Lehman and Timmermann 
[2002] demonstrated that in a sample of 306 UK pension funds over the period from 1986 to 1994 
the median pension plan underperformed a broad market index by 0.15% p.a. in UK equities and 
0.06% p.a. in international equities gross of fees. On a total portfolio level 138 UK pension plans 
were able to realize an outperformance versus an aggregated benchmark and 168 delivered an un-
derperformance. The authors further observed a low cross-sectional variability in returns indicating 
that the UK pension plan managers tend to take low relative risk versus market indices. In a sample 
of 2175 equity portfolios of UK pension funds Tonks [2001] reports an average underperformance 
of 0.006% p.a. against the FTSE All Share Index gross of fees from March 1983 to December 1997. 
However he points out that there is significant persistence across outperformers as well as across 
underperformers. Stanko [2003] reports that on average active management added value to the per-
formance of 21 public pension plans in Poland in the period from June 1999 to March 2003 on an 
overall portfolio level but no details about single asset classes are available. 
Overconfidence is a complex phenomenon with various facets. In the domain of financial markets 
Glaser and Weber [2003] differentiate between 4 different manifestations of overconfidence; mis-
calibration, better-than-average-effect, illusion of control and overoptimism. This paper only con-
centrates on the better-than-average-effect because it is directly observable in a questionnaire, it is 
relevant in the domain of financial markets as Graham, Campbell and Huang [2006] outline and it 
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serves as one explanation for the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. The 
better-than-average-effect was first observed in psychological research. Svenson [1981] notes that 
more than 80% of the participants in a survey believe themselves to be above average with respect 
to their driving skills. Taylor and Brown [1988] demonstrate that people generally tend to be prone 
to the better-than-average-effect in many fields as they believe their skills and abilities to be above 
average despite the absence of reliable information about their true level of skill compared to others. 
In a later paper (Taylor and Brown [1994]) they confirm their thesis and point out that being overly 
optimistic is usually increasing the well-being of an individual. So from a psychological standpoint 
being prone to the better-than-average can be seen as rather healthy and definitely non-pathological 
but in the domain of financial markets it can lead to overoptimistically biased expectations about 
the own abilities and the own performance in the future.  
Camerer and Lovallo [1999] present evidence from an experimental market that roughly 70% of the 
participants in their sample are prone to the better-than-average-effect in a market entry game espe-
cially when relying on the subjective perception of the own skills relative to the competitors in the 
game. They further report that the participants on average lose money due to their propensity to the 
better-than-average-effect and their overestimation of their own skills and so this results in financial 
decisions that lower their wealth. In a survey across 162 Swiss pension plans Lusenti [2006] report 
that more than half of the participants believe their achievements to be above average in the fields 
of manager selection and strategic asset allocation. On average the participants express very high 
confidence in the success of their own financial decisions concerning the degree of active manage-
ment and their choices of investment styles. They also believe that sticking to their current manag-
ers is better than exchanging managers. Those results are evidence for the very high degree of con-
fidence decision-makers of Swiss pension plans have in their own abilities, in their current active 
managers and in their own manager-selection skills. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] argue 
that overconfidence could lead to a preference for active management in a pension plan despite the 
fact that it might deliver returns below a market index. They point out that overconfidence about 
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selection skills used to identify good active managers can explain the high percentage of active 
management within US pension plans.  
In a theoretical model De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman [1991] show that overconfident 
investors can survive on financial markets but tend to take more risk and gain less expected utility 
than rational investors. Kyle and Wang [1997] show with their model that employing overconfident 
managers can be the best strategy, in the context of game theory, as both participants face a pris-
oner’s dilemma. However the choice of an overconfident manager does not lead to an efficient out-
come for both players. It is acknowledged that these models are applied directly to investors and not 
to decision-makers who have the choice of delegating the portfolio management to an external asset 
manager. However the point is to show that overconfident market participants can theoretically sur-
vive on financial markets but do not achieve the best risk-adjusted performance.  
Empirically Odean and Barber [2000] and Guiso and Jappelli [2005] demonstrate in samples of 
private investors that high trading volumes can reduce the performance results substantially due to 
increased trading costs. It seems fair to assume that the trading costs for Swiss pension plans are 
lower than for private investors but basically higher trading volumes cause more transactions costs 
for pension plans as well. 
In summary we note that it must be very difficult to beat the average performance on financial mar-
kets. But it seems that some investors are not really aware of it because the better-than-average-
effect biases their perceptions about the own skill level and the thoughness of competition. In the 
next sections it will be analyzed if this is also the case for Swiss pension plans.   
IV Data and Methods 
To assess the absolute and relative performance of Swiss pension plans I rely on two different types 
of empirical surveys. First, I refer to the annual studies from Lusenti Partners (Lusenti [2007], 
Lusenti [2006] and Lusenti [2005]) which are based on a sample of 130, 123 and 123 Swiss pension 
plans respectively. These surveys present mean and median realized annual performances across 
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different asset classes which can be compared to market index returns. Second, I analyze perform-
ance data from the ASIP Performance Comparison across 60 to 73 Swiss pension plans over differ-
ent annual periods (ASIP [2000-2006]). The availability of data about returns of pension plan port-
folios4 in different asset classes in the ASIP survey allows for a comparison between each pension 
plan’s performances within the same asset class relative to a market index. However the goal of the 
paper is not to analyze single pension plan data but to assess the past performance of the whole 
sample and to present evidence about the relative success of the Swiss pension plan industry versus 
broad market indices. 
While Lusenti rely on questionnaires that are completed by pension plans employees, ASIP uses 
financial data from the global custodians of the participating pension plans. This guarantees for 
generally-accepted calculation methods in the ASIP data and allows for a more homogenous set of 
performance data to compare. ASIP relies on returns gross of fees whereas Lusenti requests data net 
of fees. This has to be taken into account when interpreting the results. There is a certain overlap 
between the survey from Lusenti and ASIP as some pension plans participate in both studies.  
This paper does not assume that one of those surveys is singularly representative for Swiss pension 
plans because both include only a small part all pension plans in Switzerland.5 However in terms of 
assets under management the samples from Lusenti include roughly CHF 200 billion in each year 
while the samples in ASIP contain assets of roughly CHF 80 billion in 2000 to CHF 160 billion in 
2006. This reflects one third and one quarter respectively of total asset under management in the 
second pillar of Switzerland. The ratio between participating pension plans and assets under man-
agement shows that rather large pension plans participate in the ASIP and the Lusenti survey so a 
size bias cannot be ruled out. But the results of this paper are on the conservative side as larger pen-
sion plans tend to index more assets than smaller funds according to Lusenti [2003]. So this paper 
                                                   
4
 A pension plan portfolio is defined as either a single mandate to an in-house or external asset manager within a certain 
asset class or a consolidation of single mandates of a pension plan within an asset class. There is no further information 
about the performances of single mandates that are included in the consolidation of mandates of a pension plan.  
5
 In 2004 BFS [2004] counted 2935 pension plans in Switzerland. There is a decreasing trend in the last 10 years. 
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tends to underestimates the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. There is a 
self selection bias in the samples because there is no obligation to participate in either the Lusenti or 
the ASIP surveys. It is plausible that only successful and above average pension plans are incentiv-
ised to participate in those surveys. The incentive to participate in the ASIP survey might be addi-
tionally limited by the fact that a fee is charged for the participation. In light of this bias the results 
with respect to historical success with active management rather overestimate the success of the 
overall pension plan industry in Switzerland. 
Some pension plans prefer to only report part of their overall allocation to those two surveys so to 
compare overall pension plan returns might be spurious and this paper only focuses on a compari-
son of pension plan performances in domestic and international equities as well as CHF bonds with 
well established market indices. For domestic equities the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) is applied 
as a benchmark, for international equities the MSCI World Index family is used, and for CHF bonds 
the Swiss Bond Index (SBI). Because Swiss pension plans are tax exempt, the loss due to taxes on 
dividends is in most of the cases marginal and a total return index seems to be a fair comparison. It 
might be the case that many pension plans in the sample do not use those indices as their bench-
marks. But the choice of a benchmark is also an active decision that investment committees or man-
agers have to take and the MSCI index family, the SPI and the SBI can be seen as reasonable and 
investable default solutions for those asset classes. 
In order to analyze the better-than-average-effect across decision-makers of Swiss pension plans 
this paper refers to a sample of investment committee members and managers at Swiss pension 
plans. In total 584 questionnaires have been distributed and 132 have been returned. This corre-
sponds to a response rate of 22.6%. A majority of the participants’ pension plans are represented in 
either the Lusenti or the ASIP survey. 24 questionnaires contained incomplete information and 
therefore have been excluded from the analysis. As a result the professional sample consists of 108 
participants (56 investment committee members, 52 managers) who represent a total of 39 Swiss 
pension plans (22 Defined Benefit, 8 Defined Contribution, 2 Hybrids, and 7 unspecified). 
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To measure the better-than-average-effect the participants were given two different tasks in a ques-
tionnaire. First, they were asked to forecast returns of different asset classes for the calendar year of 
2006, as well as provide a self evaluation of the accuracy of their own forecasts versus the forecasts 
of the other participants. In the second task they were asked about their expectations with respect to 
their own pension plans’ future success relative to the other participants in the questionnaire. The 
exact questions in that part were about i) the chances of their pension plan to find above average 
active managers in the future, ii) the likelihood of their pension plan to achieve an above average 
risk-adjusted return in the future, and iii) the chances their internal and external managers would 
outperform the other active managers of Swiss pension plans in the sample in the future. To answer 
those questions the participants had to tick a box on a Likert scale from 1 (clearly below average) to 
7 (clearly above average). The possibility of 4 (average) is included as many participants probably 
would choose this option. The participants were well informed about their competitors in this sam-
ple as this was explicitly stated in the questionnaire.  
In the return forecasting task the participants had to provide subjective confidence intervals for the 
returns of different asset classes for 2006 that contain the realized return with a probability of 90%. 
A comparison across the lower and upper boundaries of those confidence intervals provides further 
information about the participants’ expected returns of pension plan portfolios. However no com-
parisons of implied returns from subjective confidence intervals are made because Graham and 
Campbell [2003] correctly argue that the mean of a confidence interval could be a biased result be-
cause the participants might have a skewed distribution in mind.  
5. Results 
5.1 Historical performance of Swiss pension plans 
In the annual surveys from Lusenti for the years 2004 to 2006 and ASIP from 2000 to 2006 there is 
no indication of outperformance versus market indices across Swiss pension plans. Table 1 provides 
an overview of the median performances of Swiss pension plans in different asset classes according 
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to those two surveys. The median was favored over the mean to mitigate outlier effects. The first 
three rows show the median annual returns according to the Lusenti and the ASIP survey as well as 
the return of the Swiss Bond Index (SBI) domestic. Rows four to six and seven to ten contain the 
median annual returns for Swiss and international equities of the pension plans and for the market 
indices. Except for the median returns in the ASIP sample for CHF bonds in 2000 and 2003, Swiss 
equities in 2001 and foreign equities in 2000 and 2006, Swiss pension plans have never outper-
formed the corresponding market index neither net of fees (Lusenti) nor gross of fees (ASIP). In 
most of the years the median from ASIP underperforms the annual return of the market index by 
roughly 0.5% to 1.5%.  
An analysis of all portfolios from Swiss pension plans that participate in the ASIP survey confirms 
that most portfolios in the asset classes Swiss equities, world equities and CHF bonds do not outper-
form a market index gross of fees. Table 2 shows in columns one, three and five the rank of a mar-
ket index with respect to the return for each asset class within the universe of portfolios across all 
pension plans in the ASIP survey over different time periods. For example the SPI’s return over the 
last 36 months was ranked 14 within a universe of 46 portfolios in the asset class Swiss equities. So 
32 of all the portfolios delivered a lower return than the SPI gross of fees and 13 had a higher re-
turn. The returns of indices in all analyzed asset classes are always in the better half of the pension 
plan universe except for CHF bonds in the period from June 2005 to June 2006.  
One might argue that the pension plans in the samples from ASIP manage the asset classes with a 
lower volatility than the market indices and therefore achieve a better risk-adjusted return. The col-
umns two, four and six of Table 2 list the rank of the market indices’ Sharpe Ratios for each asset 
class for the last 36 and 60 months. Those ranks are always in the better half of the overall universe 
in the sample so it is not the case that pension plans delivered better risk-adjusted returns compared 
to market indices in these asset classes.  
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Table 1 and 2 do not differentiate between active portfolios and indexed portfolios so it might be 
the case that many indexed portfolios slightly underperform the SPI and therefore median return is 
below the index return. Nonetheless this argument is not valid because of two different reasons. 
First, a report by Lusenti [2003] indicates that most of the Swiss pension plan assets in various dif-
ferent asset classes are managed actively. Out of 110 plans who answered that question 65 plans 
report to index between 0% and 10% and further 18 plans index between 10% and 25% of their 
total assets. On the other hand only 14 plans report to index at least 50% of their total assets. 
Lusenti [2003] further indicates that the percentage of indexed assets increases with the size of pen-
sion plans. As this paper deals with samples of large pension plans it rather underestimates the 
popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. For a comparison Ennis [1997] re-
ports that around 35% of the assets of US pension plans are indexed and that the trend is increasing. 
Lusenti [2003] further reports that there is no significant difference between Swiss and international 
investments with respect to the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. An 
analysis between the performance of defined contribution and defined benefit plans is not valid due 
to the low number of defined contribution plans in the sample but in line with Frauenlob [1998] no 
indications for differences appeared in the available data.  
Table 3 contains the second reason and shows that active management in equities  - but not in bonds 
- is dominant across the sample of pension plans whose decision-makers also completed the ques-
tionnaire about the better-than-average-effect. As can be seen in Table 3 the majority of all equity 
portfolios are managed actively in each year. A portfolio is defined as actively-managed if its track-
ing error was above 0.3% per annum for Swiss equities and CHF bonds and above 0.5% per annum 
for international equities.6 With this simple criterion one cannot differentiate between true indexers 
and active managers who did not spend their active risk budget. But those tracking error levels seem 
                                                   
6
 For Swiss equities it is easier to replicate the market index (SPI) than for world equities because the universe of shares 
is much smaller. That is why different levels of tracking errors for Swiss and world equities are used to define active 
portfolios. The relatively homogenous universe of CHF bonds in the SBI domestic explains the low tracking error limit 
to define active portfolios. 
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to be a good and conservative approximation. We note that the percentage of indexed portfolios has 
grown between 2001 and 2005 but active management in equities is still much more popular. For 
CHF bonds the picture looks different. This can be seen in the last row of Table 3, which demon-
strates that the pension plans in this sample apply passive management, or at least a type of man-
agement that resulted in a very low tracking error to the SBI.  
Table 3 supports the other results as it shows that most of the actively-managed equity portfolios 
from pension plans that completed the better-than-average-questionnaire have not beaten the annual 
performance of an equity market index in the years 2001 to 2005. The columns labeled “alpha +“ 
contain the number of portfolios with a return above the market index in a given year. The success 
rate, i.e. the number of portfolios that have higher annual returns than the market index, varies but is 
never above 50%. Those results indicate that the Swiss pension plans of the decision-makers who 
completed the better-than-average-questionnaire cannot outperform market indices on average and 
therefore achieved similar performances to the Lusenti and the ASIP surveys.  
We can summarize this section by saying that the implementation of the strategic asset allocation 
with active management is much more popular than indexing across Swiss pension plans. But the 
evidence about the average performance of Swiss pension plans with domestic and international 
equities does not support the dominance of active management. The median performance across 
two well established Swiss pension plan surveys is below market indices’ returns and more often 
than not active portfolios fail to beat the performance of a broad market index even gross of fees.  
5.2 Better-than-average-effect 
This paper argues that a biased view on the own skill level relative to other investors could lead to a 
heavy reliance on active management. It is now analyzed if decision-makers of Swiss pension plans 
are really prone to such a better-than-average-effect.  
To report the susceptibility to the better-than-average-effect we must first have a look at the partici-
pants’ expectations concerning their current manager’s chances for future success, their own man-
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ager selection skills and their pension plan’s chances to outperform the other participants in the 
sample. In the questionnaire the participants had to tick a box on a Likert scale between 1 (clearly 
below average) to 7 (clearly above average) including 4 (average). Each column in Table 4 contains 
the participants’ mean, the t value, the median and the standard deviation (rows three to six) for 
each one of those questions. The sample mean is above average for all questions and one sample t 
tests reveal significant differences between the sample means and the answering option “average” at 
the 1% level for all questions except the outlook to find above average active managers in the future 
which is only significant at the 10% level. This is evidence that the sample is on average prone to 
the better-than-average-effect with respect to their own and their managers’ skill level. Rows eight 
for fourteen in Table 4 contain the percentage of chosen answers by the participants. The answering 
options “average” and “slightly above average” are chosen more often than all three options below 
average and this is again evidence that the decision-makers in our sample are on average susceptible 
to the better-than-average-effect. The first two rows show the sample size and the number of miss-
ing participants. A participant’s answer is missing either because she refused to answer or because 
he does not apply internal or external management. The latter case applies in most cases.  
Correlations between the answers of the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans across those four 
questions provide information about the generality of the better-than-average-effect across the par-
ticipants. Spearman rank correlations are applied because the assumption that the participants’ an-
swers are close to normally distributed cannot be made. Higher correlations indicate that a partici-
pant expresses optimistic views across all four questions. The Spearman rank correlations indicate a 
high level of general proneness to the better-than-average-effect because all the correlations are 
significant at the 1% level and range from 0.306 to 0.541. 
In a second step we analyze if the participants in this sample are also prone to the better-than-
average-effect when forecasting returns of different asset classes themselves. The six columns in 
Table 5 each represent an asset class for which the participants had to judge the accuracy of their 
own return forecast relative to the other participants in the survey. The same Likert scale like in 
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Table 4 was applied. The means for all asset classes in Table 5 are above 4 but one sample t tests 
provide evidence that the differences are not significantly different from 4 (row four). This is evi-
dence that the participants are not significantly prone to the better-than-average-effect in the task of 
forecasting returns themselves. The only exceptions are equities and the own pension plan returns 
as the participants judge their own forecasts to be significantly above average. To be able to fore-
cast the returns of the own pension plan above average looks reasonable as the participants probably 
have better knowledge about the potential return of the own pension plan. Unsurprisingly the option 
“average” was by far the most chosen one in the questionnaire. The option “slightly above average” 
is more popular than the option “rather below average” but the differences are much smaller in the 
forecasting task than in the tasks about a pension plans chances for future success. 
This section can be concluded by saying that decision-makers of Swiss pension plans are signifi-
cantly prone to the better-than-average-effect when evaluating the chances of future success for 
their current managers and their own pension plans. But they don’t express a significant better-than-
average-effect in the task of forecasting future returns of different asset classes themselves. 
Besides the participants’ choice of answers on a Likert scale in the questionnaire there is another 
evidence of susceptibility to a better-than-average-effect in the answers from the questionnaire. It is 
related to the participants’ formulation of 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts in different 
asset classes. The participants in the sample forecast more attractive risk-return-characteristics for 
domestic equities at Swiss pension plans compared to domestic equities in general as can be seen in 
Figure 1. Figure 1 summarizes the participants’ lower and upper boundaries in the return forecast-
ing task for the asset class domestic equities in general and in Swiss pension plans with four Box-
plots. The participants expect Swiss pension plans to reduce downside risk of domestic equities but 
also give up some upside potential because the lower (higher) boundaries of their confidence inter-
vals for pension plans’ exposure to domestic equities are higher (lower) than for domestic equities 
in general. The fact that the median boundaries of the confidence intervals are narrower for the pen-
sion plans’ exposure to domestic equities than for domestic equities in general indicates that the 
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participants expect pension plans to manage this asset class with less volatility than a broad market 
index.7 To test the level of significance across boundary differences a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is applied. It shows that the differences between the lower and the upper differences 
are significant at the 5% level. Parametric tests would not fit the data because the participants’ fore-
casts are far away from being normaly distributed and outliers might bias the results. Figure 2 con-
tains the same analysis for the asset class CHF bonds. It shows that the decision-makers of Swiss 
pension plans on aggregate expect to match the downside risk of CHF bonds in general as there are 
no significant differences between the participants’ lower boundaries. However the participants 
expect to have a higher upside potential in CHF bonds as the upper boundaries are significantly 
higher for CHF bonds in Swiss pension plans than in general. Figure 3 shows the lower and upper 
boundaries for the forecasted returns of the participants’ own pension plans versus an average Swiss 
pension plan. The participants forecast a higher upside potential for the own pension plan and a 
lower downside risk and both effects are significant according to Wilcoxon signed rank test. Those 
results are in line with the participant’s propensity to the better-than-average-effect about the future 
success of their managers and their pension plans.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Some Swiss pension plans delivered extraordinary good performances in equities over the last cou-
ple of years but a majority of the Swiss pension plans that participate voluntarily in well established 
performance surveys delivered equity performances below market indices on an absolute as well as 
on a risk-adjusted basis even gross of fees. This does not imply that active management cannot add 
value for Swiss pension plans’s equity portfolios but it shows how difficult the selection and the 
maintenance of successful active managers are. Many asset managers point out that past perform-
ance is no indication for future performance so it cannot be ruled out that the managers in this sam-
                                                   
7
 Pearson and Tukey [1965] numerically show that dividing a 90% quantile (i.e. subtracting the 5% quantile from the 
95% quantile) by 3.25 approximates the standard deviation of a distribution. Therefore narrower confidence intervals 
can be related to lower expected volatilities. 
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ple will outperform broad market indices in the future. But in order to meet expectations future re-
sults must be much better than historical results.  
To put this evidence into perspective we always have to bear in mind that we cannot directly link a 
participant’s answers in the questionnaire to the investments of his/her pension plan as we do not 
know how big the influence of one decision-maker on the whole pension plan investment is. In 
other words just because one decision-maker expresses biased expectations does not imply that his 
pension plan will fail with active management or choose an inappropriate asset allocation. Never-
theless it is puzzling that most of the decision-makers in the sample are still highly convinced about 
the abilities of their current managers, their own manager selection skills and the chances for future 
success of their pension plan despite the observable track record. It’s even more puzzling when you 
consider that a comparison with the average is very easy on financial markets and that the decision-
makers in the sample are not prone to the better-than-average-effect when forecasting returns on 
financial markets themselves. So where is this gap between biased expectations and realized per-
formances in equities coming from? As this paper suggest, the better-than-average-effect is one 
explanation. Further research is needed to analyze what might explain the strong presence of this 
better-than-average-effect across investors. A few arguments are now discussed in the context of 
Swiss pension plans.   
At first glance one might argue that the pension plans in this sample might not be aware of their 
disappointing relative performance versus broad market indices. However this argument is weak 
because the pension plans in this sample are widely regarded as leading pension plans in Switzer-
land and they participate voluntarily in popular surveys of Swiss pension plans. They receive the 
results of the Lusenti and the ASIP surveys automatically as they are participants of those studies so 
it seems unlikely that they never look that the results of those surveys. So the assumption that the 
decision-makers of Swiss pension plans are aware of poor relative median performance of Swiss 
pension plans versus market indices seems safe. Of course, for all pension plans who have not yet 
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implemented a proper measurement of their performances in different asset classes relative to ap-
propriate market indices the recommendation clearly is to start sooner rather than later.  
Another very simple explanation could be that if the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans kept 
on believing to have above average managers and above average selections skills they might still be 
convinced to outperform in the long run despite the disappointing results so far. Indeed it takes a lot 
of time and data to be able to correctly differentiate between a managers’ level of skill and pure 
luck Waring and Siegel [2003]. If that was the case the participants in our sample will not put a lot 
of weight on their recent performance but more on their perception about their chances of future 
performance. However further research needs to be done in order to understand how much an indi-
vidual weighs knowledge from the past versus hope for the future.  
Less simplistic arguments can be found in the domain of the decision-makers’ incentives to express 
a highly confident view about current managers in the own pension plan and about the own manag-
ers selection skills. Camerer and Lovallo [1999] offer the so called reference-group-neglect as an 
explanation for why people could seem to be prone to the better-than-average-effect. If the partici-
pants in a sample do not pay attention to the definition of the peer group – in this paper the Swiss 
pension plans that report to the ASIP survey as was clearly stated – they might compare themselves 
with an inappropriate peer group – in our case maybe with all pension plans in Switzerland. Be-
cause of the self-selecting nature of the ASIP survey and the required use of a global custodian for 
the data provision it is possible that the average performance of the pension plans in the ASIP sur-
vey is above the unobservable average of all pension plans in Switzerland. So the benchmark to 
beat in our sample might be higher than a benchmark that consists of all Swiss pension plans and 
the reference-group-neglect offers an explanation for the high proportion of participants that dem-
onstrate the better-than-average-effect.  
Furthermore it might be the case that some decision-makers in our sample are more concerned with 
being above average in the Swiss pension plan universe than with the relative performance versus a 
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market index (this is the case for UK pension plans according to a study by Blake, Lehman and 
Timmermann [2002]). However this argument is no excuse for the poor relative performance versus 
market indices because the goal of active management in traditional asset classes like equities and 
bonds is usually to outperform market indices and not pension plan peer groups.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] present other incentives for pension plan managers to ap-
ply active management despite a lack of success in the past. One reason could be job security. Ac-
tive management requires the decision-makers to select active managers. This is arguably a more 
complex and interesting process when compared to the selection of indexers, which tends to priori-
tize the factor price. This study suggests that some decision-makers may fear that their ability to add 
value is diluted when too high a proportion of their plan’s assets are indexed. Decision-makers have 
strong incentives to demonstrate confidence about their active managers and their own manager 
selection skills going forward, and to ignore disappointing performance relative to market indices in 
the past to defend their employment. 
Second the performance of an active manager might not be the whole story behind an appointment 
to run portfolios for a pension plan. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] call such a phenome-
non “schmoozing”. It describes the colorful manner that asset managers sometimes explain their 
stock decisions, hold hands with their clients and explain their absolute and relative performance ex 
post. With successful “schmoozing”, active managers might be able to convince decision-makers at 
Swiss pension plans about their skills in spite of an unsuccessful track record. As outlined before, 
investment committees of Swiss pension plans do not only consist of investment professionals but 
also of delegates of the board of trustees who might be less familiar with daily portfolio manage-
ment. And it seems plausible that an active manager with excellent schmoozing abilities is in a good 
position to be retained by a pension plan despite a relative underperformance versus market indices.  
In line with this thinking another incentive for Swiss pension plans not to replace unsuccessful ac-
tive managers can be seen in the linkage of other corporate services some captive active managers 
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provide. Large asset managers typically affiliated to banking groups not only offer the sponsor of a 
pension plan active management services for the pension plan’s assets but also services in the field 
of credit management, refinancing, mortgages, financial consulting, currency management and 
many other services to the sponsoring businesses. The decision-makers at the sponsor organization 
have incentives to retain active managers for the pension fund which also provide such other valu-
able services to the company. Especially in a defined contribution scheme where the risk of the re-
tirement payments are borne by the employees a company can pay for many services via manage-
ment fees for pension plan assets and take those costs off the current account statements of the 
company. To express a strong belief in the future success of active managers might be a convenient 
way to hide the true motivation for keeping active managers with a disappointing relative perform-
ance. Further research is needed to analyze the incentives on a personal level and the effects of the 
regulatory framework with respect to the separation of the pension plan and the sponsor group.  
In the case of in-house active managers the problem is more of a personal one. It is likely to be 
much easier to hire and fire external active asset managers than in-house managers because the per-
sonal relationship with external people is usually less strong than with in-house employees. This 
might be a reason why the participants in our sample indicate that they are confident about the skill 
of their current internal active managers relative to the other pension plans’ managers. Probably 
those answers reflect the view that there are no opportunities for a replacement and the current setup 
is still perceived as attractive despite the poor track record. Pretending to feel confident with a me-
diocre in-house active manager could probably be more convenient for an investment committee 
member than firing this colleague.  
Such qualitative arguments appear plausible at first glance but require more research to analyze the 
interdependent relationships in more depth and to prove or reject these hypotheses.   
A completely different type of incentive for active management despite a bad track record is offered 
by Odean and Barber [2001]. It might be the case that active management is perceived as more en-
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tertaining than indexing by the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans. As a proxy to measure the 
degree of entertainment it is also analysed whether there are any differences in the answering pat-
terns between those participants who have a private asset management account and those who do 
not. An independent t test shows that the management of an own account has neither a significant 
influence on their proneness to the better-than-average-effect nor on the formulation of return fore-
casts. This is evidence that the degree being entertained by actively managing money is not related 
to each other in this sample. 
After those potential arguments that explain the occurrence of a better-than-average-effect in the 
sample we now turn to a recommendation about how to deal with it. The issue is theoretically ad-
dressed in a model by Thorley [1999]. He compares the competition to generate an outperformance 
on financial markets to a basketball freethrow shooting contest. Every participant can choose be-
tween throwing freethrows himself or not throwing and just getting the average score. The throwing 
corresponds to active management and the latter to indexing. It only makes sense to shoot the 
freethrows if a participant believes to be an above average freethrow shooter compared to all the 
other contestants in the game. If only children are playing on the court shooting freethrows as an 
adult might be a good opportunity to beat the average score. By contrast when on the court with a 
professional NBA team not shooting oneself but taking the average score is probably a more suc-
cessful strategy. So the decision about implementing the strategic asset allocation with active man-
agers should depend on how the overall level of competition and the own abilities compared to the 
competitors are perceived. The better-than-average-effect might bias the perception of personal 
abilities and skills relative to the other competitors. The historical performance of Swiss pension 
plans supports the view that not every Swiss pension plan is aware of its strengths and weaknesses 
relative to the other competitors on financial markets. So the model recommends to analyze in 
which asset classes the pension plan should have a true advantage versus most of the participants in 
an asset class and only apply active management in those asset classes. 
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Figures 1, 2, and 3 
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 the distribution of the participants’ subjective 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts are 
shown as boxplot diagramms. The boxplots reflect all forecasts  for upper and lower boundaries in the different asset 
classes. The Y-Axis indicates the forecasted returns for upper and lower boundaries in the Figures.  The solid black line 
in each boxplots indicates the median and the box itself indicates the second and third quartile of the distribution. Bul-
lets (stars) reflect outliers that are more than 1.5 (3) times above or below the top and bottom end of each box. The 
dotted lines facilitate to see the differences between forecasts for an asset class in general and forecasts for the asset 
class at Swiss pension plans. Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied to determine the level of significance of the differ-
ences between the upper and lower boundaries. 
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Figure 1: Lower and upper boundaries of return forecasts of Swiss equities in
general and in Swiss pension plans
The differences of the upper and lower boundaries are significant at the 5% level in a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
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Figure 2: Lower and upper boundaries of return forecasts of CHF bonds in
general and in Swiss pension plans
The differences of the lower boundaries are significant at the 5% level in a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
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Figure 3: Lower and upper boundaries of return forecasts of the own pension
plan and an average Swiss pension plan
The differences of the upper and lower boundaries are significant at the 5% level in a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
 
 
